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I. INTRODUCTION 
 As the earth continues to warm and the impacts of that warming 
trend loom larger, the question becomes whether and to what degree do 
governments have responsibility to respond to that threat. The potential 
range of threats and impacts from climate change vary greatly and gov-
ernments’ ability to respond, effectively and efficiently, exceeds that of 
the individual and therefore must fall on the greater collection of indi-
viduals.1 In the United States, one way that the collection of individuals 
is represented, albeit with limitations, is by the government that operates 
for the collective public good.2 This article does not debate the potential 
impacts of climate change nor the reliability of climate change science. 
Rather, it focuses on what responsibility state governments have under 
the public trust doctrine in United States jurisprudence and determines 
how effective the response of government should be when viewed in a 
public trust context.  
 The reason for a focus on the public trust doctrine within this article 
is twofold: (1) common ground and (2) inadequate legislative responses. 
Each state has one similarity in its common law, thus setting each state 
on par with one another for broad discussions of applicable law, and that 
similarity is the public trust doctrine (“PTD”).3 The public trust doctrine 
                                                
1. See generally Summary for Policymakers, IPCC 4–7 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Report]; 
Caroline Cress, Its Time To Let Go: Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help the World Breathe Easi-
er, 92 N.C.L. REV. 236, 237–240 (2013). 
2. Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 
17, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/. 
3. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970), available at 
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provides a common pathway to evaluate governmental responses, reac-
tive or proactive, to the looming climate change issues.4 However, this 
pathway can result in errant and tortured constructions of the public trust 
doctrine.5 This article will explore the relationship between the public 
trust doctrine, climate change, and governmental responses to the im-
plementation of alternative energy solutions such as offshore wind or 
hydrokinetic power generation without straying into a “tortured construc-
tion” of the doctrine6 or by addressing related resources as some courts 
have done.7 This is an area of immediate importance given the rising 
risks of climate change and potential for grave impacts to be felt around 
the world,8 but most especially in the very areas on which the public trust 
doctrine is based—submerged lands and navigable waterways.  
 The statutory or regulatory responses to climate change impacts 
have been lacking thus far, which leads to alternative proposals for at-
tempting to mitigate the potential impacts of climate change or adapt to 
those that have occurred.9 However, in the face of the far ranging impacts 
of climate change, the laissez-faire approach is inadequate and perhaps 
violative of the fiduciary duty imposed under the public trust doctrine.10 
Moreover, one could argue that the lack of action will result in aliena-
tion, albeit not through the transfer of property as in a normal real estate 
                                                                                                         
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1359/; COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 3 (David C. Slade, R. Kerry Kehoe, Jane K. Stahl eds., 2d ed. 
1997), available at http://www.shoreline.noaa.gov/docs/8d5885.pdf.  
4. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010) [hereinafter Adapting to Climate 
Change]. 
5. Andrew Ballentine, Note, Full of Hot Air: Why the Atmospheric Trust Litigation Theory is 
an Unworkable Attempt to Expand the Public Trust Doctrine Beyond its Common Law Foundations, 
12 DARTMOUTH L. J. 98 (2014) (discussing why the atmospheric trust litigation theory is an un-
workable attempt to expand the public trust doctrine beyond its common law foundation). But see 
Jordan M. Ellis, The Sky’s The Limit: Applying The Public Trust Doctrine To The Atmosphere, 86 
TEMP. L. REV. 807 (2014) (arguing for an expansion of the public trust doctrine to include the at-
mosphere). 
6. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working 
Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 229 (2006) (citing Richard J. Lazarus, 
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 710–11 (1986)). 
7. See generally Geer v. State of Conn., 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklaho-
ma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
8. See generally IPCC Report, supra note 1. 
9. Infra Part III.C and Part V. 
10. Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines in the Disappearing Sand: A Re-evaluation of Shoreline 
Rights and Regimes A Quarter Century After Bell v. Town of Wells, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 481, 
490 (2011) (“[E]ach state ha[s] a duty to protect lands in the public trust, and that this obligation to 
preserve access under the public trust doctrine is inalienable”); Infra Part III. 
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transaction, of public trust lands as they are eroded or simply submerged 
by rising sea levels.11  
 This article argues that the state has a duty to act in a proactive, ra-
ther than reactive, manner in its approach to mitigating the impacts of 
climate change by seeking out opportunities to incentivize private indus-
tries within its jurisdiction to pursue energy production in a manner that 
contributes less to the growing climate change maelstrom. Thus, the ap-
proach that this article champions is not a per se expansion of the public 
trust doctrine, as has been attempted in related areas,12 but rather is an 
application of fiduciary duty within the scope of the public trust doctrine 
to governmental responses to attempt to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change and global warming.13 
 Part II of this article addresses the potential impacts of climate 
change in Florida. Part III examines alternative power solutions and the 
statutory framework required to implement them. Part IV addresses the 
public trust doctrine and its development from English common law ori-
gins to the position it currently holds in United States jurisprudence and a 
discussion of the limits to which the doctrine can be expanded. Part V 
offers a proposal for holding states accountable under the public trust 
doctrine for their work, or in the alternative not working, to protect pub-
lic trust assets by mitigating the potential impacts of climate change 
through proactive consideration of measures to encourage more carbon 
neutral solutions. This article concludes that the public trust doctrine can 
be a mechanism to require action on the behalf of state government under 
its fiduciary duty obligation to take proactive measures, such as the pro-
motion of offshore power generation solutions, to combat the potential 
impacts of climate change. 
II. THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS ON FLORIDA 
A. Erosion of the Florida Coastline 
 Florida is particularly sensitive to the threat of climate change im-
pacts due to a variety of factors.14 The most threatening impact in Florida 
                                                
11. See generally Sax, supra note 3. 
12. Infra Part III.C. 
13. Infra Part V. 
14. See generally Karl Havens, Rising seas bring heavy burden to Florida coastal economy. 
Can it adapt?, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 16, 2015,5:39 AM), http://theconversation.com/rising-
seas-bring-heavy-burden-to-florida-coastal-economy-can-it-adapt-38766; Robert J. Nicholls & Jason 
A. Lowe, Benefits of mitigation of climate change for coastal areas, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 
229, 233 (2004), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378004000445 
(Table 1 displays a variety of factors that could potentially affect coastal areas, such as Florida). 
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is rising sea levels, especially when combined with the erosion of coastal 
land that rising sea levels will cause when combined with normal tidal 
ebbs and flows.15 Climate change is defined as a change, typically classi-
fied as significant, in the measurement of climate, as observed by scien-
tists, which lasts for an extended period of time and can encompass “ma-
jor changes in temperature, precipitation, or wind patterns, among other 
effects . . .”16 Climate change is linked to the increase in global tempera-
tures due to a rise in greenhouse gases (“GHGs”), also known as global 
warming,17 and as a result is causing climate patterns to change, among 
other impacts.18 These increases in GHGs cause increases in the amount 
of radiation trapped in the atmosphere rather than reflected from the 
earth’s surface, clouds, and oceans, which in turn cause the general 
warming of the atmosphere through the greenhouse effect.19 However, 
there are natural and anthropogenic causes of climate change20 and the 
level of impacts between those two sources is the key issue in determin-
ing how best to mitigate,21 to the extent that it is possible, increases in the 
underlying causes of climate change and adapt to those impacts.22 
 The loss of coastal areas due to rising sea levels and erosion is one 
of the major factors that result from climate change impacts in Florida 
and its impact in Florida is twofold.23 First, the erosion of coastal areas 
presents a major impact to the economy of the state of Florida due to lost 
tourism revenues for both municipalities and private entities, such as ho-
tels, restaurants, and similarly situated businesses that could feel the im-
pact of rising sea levels. Second, a rise in sea level would likely result in 
significant erosion of coastal lands around the state and would pose a 
                                                
15. Havens, supra note 14; see also Researchers and lawmakers warn: Florida is ‘Ground Ze-
ro’ for sea level rise, RAWSTORY (Apr. 22, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/04/re
searchers-and-lawmakers-warn-florida-is-ground-zero-for-sea-level-rise/. 
16. Climate Change: Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/ (last 
updated Mar. 18, 2014). 
17. Id. (defining Global Warming as “the recent and ongoing rise in global average tempera-
ture near Earth's surface”). 
18. Id.; see generally IPCC Report, supra note 1. 
19. Randall S. Abate & Dr. Sarah Ellen Krejci, Climate Change Impacts on Ocean and Coastal 
Law: Scientific Realities and Legal Responses, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND 
COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) (citing to 4 
Elizabeth Kay Berner & Robert A. Berner, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: WATER, AIR, AND 
GEOCHEMICAL CYCLES 13 (1995) [hereinafter Climate Change Impacts]. 
20. Id. at 2–5 (discussing the basic framework of Earth’s climate and anthropogenic contribu-
tion to climate change). 
21. Kelley M. Jancaitis, Florida on the Coast of Climate Change: Responding to Rising Seas, 
31 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 157, 169–86 (2008).  
22. Id. at 186–94; see generally J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural 
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010). 
23. Nicholls & Lowe, supra note 14, at 234 (Table 2 presents effects of sea-level rise). 
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major challenge to the population in terms of displacement24 and loss or 
reduction in public and private property.25 
 As the Florida economy faces challenges due to potential impacts of 
climate change, it is important to understand how varied the economy in 
Florida is and its strategic placement relative to the United States.26 One 
area of Florida’s economy that could be negatively impacted is the agri-
cultural sector. The agricultural sector in Florida is a major producer of 
oranges, both domestically and globally, and is also one of the leading 
states in the southeastern United States for farm income.27 A significant 
change in climate conditions would negatively impacts the productivity 
of Florida’s various agricultural industries and cause declines in the yield 
as much as fourteen percent with increases in temperature of six degree 
Fahrenheit and rainfall of ten percent.28 As of 2013, the Office of Eco-
nomic and Demographic Research estimated that agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting in the state accounted for approximately $9 billion 
dollars in gross domestic product.29 However, when viewing the impacts 
of the agricultural industry on the state the valuation goes up significant-
ly and as of 2012 that impact was valued in excess of $100 billion.30 
Therefore, should the worst case scenarios foreseen by the EPA’s analy-
sis on Florida come true, the potential exposure of harm to the State of 
Florida is in excess of $14 billion in losses to the economy.31 
 The case of tourism is even more pronounced in terms of potential 
losses due to climate change impacts being and a rising sea level would 
cause significant loss of property and real estate damages.32 In Florida, 
real estate and property are closely linked and are major driving forces in 
the economy.33 Rising sea levels not only pose risks to the human popu-
                                                
24. Infra Part II.B. 
25. Jancaitis, supra note 21, at 161–62. 
26. Florida: An Economic Overview, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/presentations/economic/FlEconomicOverview_1-6-
15.pdf. 
27. Florida Quick Facts, STATEOFFLORIDA.COM, http://www.stateofflorida.com%2Fflorquicfa
c.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
28. EPA, supra note 16, at 4. 
29. Gross Domestic Product – 5 Year Analysis, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
RESEARCH, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/special-research-
projects/economic/2011_FL_state_GDP.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
30. Jaime Sloane, Florida’s Agriculture Industry Continues to Grow, WUFT NEWS (Oct. 23, 
2013), http://www.wuft.org/news/2013/10/23/floridas-agriculture-industry-continues-to-grow/. 
31. Id.; EPA, supra note 16, at 3. 
32. Jancaitis, supra note 21, at 165–66. 
33. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, supra note 26 (Real Estate and rent-
al and leasing are approximately $130 billion in GDP for State of Florida). 
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lation, but also pose a significant risk of loss of habitat for numerous 
species that live in the wetlands and lowlands of Florida’s coastlines.34 
B. Rising Water, Retreating Population 
 The state of Florida is positioned, rather precariously, for the poten-
tial impacts of climate change especially as they may affect the coastal 
areas.35 Florida has the most miles of coastline than that of any other 
state in the continental United States and second only to Alaska.36 This is 
a significant point in any discussion regarding the true scope of danger 
faced as the sea levels rise, Florida, due to its relatively low lying topog-
raphy, could be disproportionately impacted relative to the majority of 
states.37 This threat is evinced by the erosion that can be caused by hurri-
canes and the staggering economic costs, both in repairs and tourism 
losses that accompany that erosion. The quintessential case for this sce-
nario is demonstrated in Stop the Beach Renourishment and the battle of 
recovery in Walton County after significant damage was done to the 
coastal bluffs and dunes38 in hurricane-related erosion.39 The case was 
taken all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, but was de-
cided on grounds related to the avulsion of the sand due to the beach re-
nourishment project—an subject only tangentially related to the scope of 
this article but nevertheless foretelling example of how property rights 
are affected by states’ reactions and adaptations to eroding coastlines.40 
 As the sea level rises, there are few options available to residents in 
low-lying areas other than retreat41 or adaptation.42 In evaluating the po-
                                                
34. EPA, supra note 16, at 3. 
35. See generally Orrin Pikey, Sea Level Rise and The World’s Beaches, COASTAL CARE (Jan. 
11, 2015), http://coastalcare.org/2011/01/sea-level-rise-and-the-worlds-beaches/ (discussing the 
potential ramifications of sea level rise on beaches). 
36. Janice C. Beaver, U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE 3–4 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21729.pdf (listing 
Florida with 1,350 miles of general coastline in Table 3). 
37. Id.; Elevation of Southern Florida: Image of the Day, NASA (Sept. 9, 2004), 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=4818 (noting the level of flooding that would 
occur with 5 and 10 meter rises in sea level throughout southern Florida). 
38. Walton County, Florida Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction, US ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS MOBILE DISTRICT EA-6 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/Portals/46/docs/planning_environmental/docs/Planning%20Reports/
Walton%20County%20HSDR%20Final%20Report%20Volume%20II%20May%2024%202013.pdf 
(describing how the coastline featured prominent bluffs and dunes that ranged from eleven and a half 
feet to in excess of sixty feet in height and averaged twenty five and a half feet as of a 1988 survey). 
39. Dixon, supra note 10, at 505–12 (discussing the factual background of Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2009)). 
40. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 732-33 
(2009); Dixon, supra note 10, at 511–12. 
41. Jancaitis, supra note 21, at 191–93 (discussing retreat as a potential strategy for dealing 
with sea level rise). 
72 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 6:1 
tential impact on the population, a recent study estimated that almost 
500,000 Florida residents live in areas where the property line is less 
than three feet about the high tide line, a figure that represents approxi-
mately twenty-one percent of the state.43 By increasing the altitude to six 
feet above sea level, the impacted population increases to just over 2.6 
million.44 Ultimately, retreat may be the most economically efficient way 
to adapt to rising sea levels despite the anthropological upheaval that 
would result.45 Incidentally, retreat may be an increasingly positive op-
tion as the reduction in pressures from human development of coastal 
areas might allow the coastal environments to react in a positive, more 
natural manner to the rising seas and permit individuals to continue en-
joying the use of these coastal areas.46 
III. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND 
ROADBLOCKS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in United States Jurisprudence 
1. The Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine 
 The public trust doctrine (“PTD”) is an ancient common law doc-
trine47 that imposes various duties on the state, which acts as a trustee of 
the public lands under the trust.48 The doctrine’s exact legal origins are 
somewhat murky, but the doctrine firmly took root under the English 
common law tradition and thus passed on to the newly formed United 
States of America after the Revolutionary War.49 The Supreme Court 
originally formed the PTD around its traditional boundaries of the abso-
lute right to “navigable waters, and the soils under them, passed to the 
states upon admission to the union, for the ‘common use’ of the ‘peo-
                                                                                                         
42. Dixon, supra note 10, at 524–30 (discussing potential adaptation strategies for rising sea 
levels). 
43. Ben Strauss, et al., Florida and the Surging Sea: A vulnerability assessment with projec-
tions for sea level rise and coastal flood risk 24 (2014), available at http://sealevel.climatecentral.org
/uploads/ssrf/FL-Report.pdf (Table 4 cites 489,925 in estimated affected population). 
44. Id. (Table 4 cites 2,655,967 in estimated affected population). 
45. Jancaitis, supra note 21, at 191. 
46. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risk of Climate Change and 
Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 17, 20 (2007), 
available at http://eau.sagepub.com/content/19/1/17.full.pdf+html. 
47. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES, 1.2.1, 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. Ed. 1876); see also 
Sidney F. Ansbacher, Muddying the Public Trust Doctrine One Vote at a Time, 29 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 221, 222–24 (2014) [hereinafter Muddying PTD]. 
48. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
49. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of 
the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine: Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty?, 19 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 54 (1998). 
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ple.’”50 However, the doctrine’s English basis was that “the King is the 
owner of all navigable rivers, bays, and shores below the low water 
mark, and he owns them, not as trustee, but in full dominion and proprie-
ty.”51 This scope of the King’s ownership was limited in that there could 
not be restriction of use of the waterways for transportation, commerce, 
and as a source of fishing for the people.52 The United States has adhered 
to this legal principle of restricting the absolute right of the government, 
in lieu of the King,53 by requiring that “certain crucial natural resources 
are the shared, common property of all citizens that cannot be subject to 
private ownership and must be preserved and protected by the govern-
ment.”54 
 This common law tradition is applicable both to the original states 
and those that joined the union afterwards.55 The American twist on the 
PTD also presents a change in the responsibilities of the owner, which is 
subject to a fiduciary duty standard.56 In addition to the standard duties of 
a fiduciary, the state is also restrained in its ability to alienate the public 
lands and that uses of such land should not interfere with the original 
purposes of the trust.57 
 While the Supreme Court had set the boundaries of the PTD accord-
ing to the common law tradition,58 there have been various attempts to 
                                                
50. Lewis, supra note 49 at 54; Cf. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) 
(holding that the State gained title in fee simple to lands influenced by the tides even though they 
were not navigable in fact at the time of Mississippi’s admission to the union). 
51. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 52 (1821). 
52. Id. 
53. Martin, 41 U.S. at 367 (“When the Revolution took place, the people of each State became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character held the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and 
the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the 
constitution to the general government. A grant, therefore, made by their authority, must be tried and 
determined by different principles from those which apply to grants of the British crown, where the 
title is held by a single individual in trust for the whole nation.”). 
54. Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 PLANNING & 
ENVTL. L. No. 8, p. 7 (Aug. 2013) (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
source Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970)). 
55. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (discussing the nature of navigable water-
ways in relation to the State of Alabama’s admittance into the Union); Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 
221, 226–27 (Fla. 1919) (discussing how the public trust doctrine is applicable to the State of Flori-
da). 
56. Edgar Washburn & Alejandra Núñez, Is the Public Trust a Viable Mechanism to Regulate 
Climate Change?, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23, 25 (Fall 2012) (“The king held title to the soil 
beneath the sea and arms of the sea (navigable waters) in his sovereign capacity and could grant the 
beds of navigable waters into private ownership . . .”) [hereinafter Is the Public Trust]. 
57. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082–83 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Infra Part 
IV.A.2. 
58. See generally Geer, 161 U.S. at 519; Martin, 41 U.S. at 367. 
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expand the scope of the PTD beyond those initial boundaries.59 Those 
attempts to expand the PTD have met with some success, as in the case 
of expanding the PTD to include traditional uses of water or submerged 
lands,60 but most have failed when they sought to reach beyond the tradi-
tional scope of the doctrine.61 The courts have had difficulty with fram-
ing issues that arise under the PTD, especially where the claims brought 
by the plaintiffs amount to an attempt to expand the doctrine itself, such 
as in the Alec L. case as opposed to more straightforward application of 
the PTD itself.62 The scope of the PTD has often remained tied to its 
common law roots,63 which is its source of the strength of the doctrine,64 
and that common law basis should not be confused as having been ex-
panded in the instance where a legislature enacts constitutional environ-
mental rights or statutory provisions.65  
                                                
59. See generally Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), reh’g denied sub nom, 
Alec. L. v. Perciasepe, 2013 WL 2248001, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22, 2013), aff’d sub nom, Alec L. ex 
rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. 
Ct. 774 (2014); Kanuk v. State, No. 3AN1107474, 2012 WL 8262438 (Alaska Super. Mar. 16, 
2012), aff’d, Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 259–60 (Cal. 1971) (discussing the Public 
Trust as traditionally defined and how the trust has been expanded to include additional related 
rights); MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE (2013) (discussing the Nature’s Trust adaptation of the Public Trust doctrine and 
how the Atmospheric Trust Litigation theory approaches climate change) [hereinafter Nature’s 
Trust]; MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, aND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 99 (William C. G. Burns & Hari 
M. Osofsky eds., 2011) [hereinafter Adjudicating Climate Change]; Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647–8 (1986) [hereinafter Changing Conceptions].  
60. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d at 1082; Marks, 6 Cal.3d at 259–60 (discussing the Public Trust as 
traditionally defined and how the trust has been expanded to include additional related rights). 
61. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), reh’g denied sub nom, Alec. L. v. 
Perciasepe, 2013 WL 2248001, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22, 2013), aff’d sub nom, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. 
McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 
(2014); Kanuk v. State, No. 3AN1107474, 2012 WL 8262438 (Alaska Super. Mar. 16, 2012), aff’d, 
Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014). 
62. Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that “[u]nd
er the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to 
protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources”); Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 
11. 
63. Is the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 26 (citing to Marks and Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. 
Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), as examples of the limits of the judicial expansion of Public Trust 
Doctrine). 
64. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 6, at 229 (citing Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 631, 710–11 (1986)); See generally George P. Smith & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust 
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 
(2006). 
65. Is the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 26. 
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 While the states are trustees under the PTD and their ownership is 
subject to restrictions from the federal government, those restrictions do 
not create a duty for the federal government under the PTD.66 In Martin 
v. Waddell’s Lessee, the rationale that the Court employed was that 
“[w]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became them-
selves sovereign; and in that character, held the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters, and the soil under them; for their own common use, 
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the 
general government.”67 The Supreme Court later discussed this limitation 
in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, wherein the Court stated that the 
power retained by the United States is for “the purposes of navigation in 
interstate and foreign commerce.”68 
2. Legal Duties Implied to Trustees Under the Public Trust 
Doctrine 
 The Supreme Court has touched on the public trust doctrine sporad-
ically throughout history, as far back as the 1840s69 and as recently as 
2012,70 but the seminal case is Illinois Central Railroad Company.71  
 In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court reviewed a series of legisla-
tive acts by the legislature of the State of Illinois to convey title to the 
lakebed, which is submerged lands, of Chicago’s harbor of Lake Michi-
gan to the Illinois Central Railroad Company.72 At the time of the legisla-
                                                
66. Is the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 25 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 171–72 (1979)); See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Infra Part IV.C.2. 
67. Martin, 41 U.S. at 367; See also Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 4, at 798–9; Is 
the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 25 (explaining how the Equal Footing doctrine operates such that 
“each subsequently admitted state acquired the beds of navigable waters in its sovereign capacity at 
statehood” subject to a federal law limitation that “the navigable waters that passed to the states 
under the equal footing doctrine are those that are navigable-in-fact or are susceptible to being used, 
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are, or may be, 
conducted at the time of statehood.”[emphasis added]); See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Com-
parative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the 
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010); Ballentine, supra note 
5, at 98 (noting that the public trust doctrine does not apply, per se, to the federal government but to 
the states). 
68. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012). 
69. Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 212; Martin, 41 U.S. at 367. 
70. PPL Montana, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1215. 
71. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust 
Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 680–85 
(2012) (discussing application of PTD in the federal system and citing to Illinois Central that the 
decision was a “judicial explication of state, rather than federal, law principles”) [hereinafter The 
Public Trust Doctrine]. 
72. See generally The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 71, at 680–85. Contra Adapting to 
Climate Change, supra note 4, at 801 (distinguishing private ownership of public trust doctrine lands 
is also subject to limitation based on the navigability of the waterway); Is the Public Trust, supra 
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tive action, there were a number of entities that were vying for control of 
this area of Chicago, based on disputed claims of controlling interest.73 
The land was occupied by various structures and tracks claimed by the 
Illinois Central Railroad Company.74 The Supreme Court wrestled with 
the appropriateness of the legislative acts in light of several theories, but 
ultimately limited the ability of the legislature to convey title to those 
public lands based on the premise that the “public trust cannot be relin-
quished by the state, except as to parcels used in promoting the interest 
of the public and without the substantial impairment of the public interest 
in the remaining lands and waters.”75  
 This limitation on the alienation of public trust lands has been 
adopted in “virtually every state jurisdiction as a matter of state common 
law.”76 The Supreme Court’s reasoning was that the alienation of those 
public lands, which were of significance to the people of the State of Illi-
nois due to the role of the harbor of Chicago, and the resulting alienation 
in the view of the Court “plac[ing] the same in the hands of a private 
corporation . . . is a proposition that cannot be defended.”77 The Court 
held that position of the property was such that, being of a public nature 
as it was, that the land was held “by the whole of the people for purposes 
in which the whole people are interested.”78 The Court further noted that 
the legislative action was akin to abdication and that the State, as trustees 
under the public trust could “no more abdicate its trust over property in 
which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils 
under them . . . without impairment of the public interest . . . than it can 
abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the 
preservation of the peace.”79 The Court concluded that the State’s trus-
teeship of the public trust lands was a role, or alternatively an affirmative 
                                                                                                         
note 56, at 25 (discussing the limitation for private owners will vary from no limitation, for owners 
of non-navigable waterways, to strict limitations on property rights extend only to the waterway). 
73. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 433 (discussing how the lands were attributed to the State of 
Illinois upon their admittance to the union and that as a matter of law “lands covered by tidewaters” 
are under the ownership of the State). 
74. Id.; see generally State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989) (analogizing the Rail-
way’s land as fee simple subject to condition subsequent, which was a restriction that the land be use 
for public purposes); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 
1979) (holding that the Lewis Wharf statutes gave grantees title to land below low water mark in fee 
simple, but subject to conditions subsequent that it be used for the public purpose for which it was 
granted). 
75. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453; see also Is the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 25. 
76. Is the Public Trust, supra note 56, at 25 (discussing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. as an example of le-
gal action to curtail the actions of the Illinois legislature, as opposed to an agency, that had been 
complacent in its grant of land to the railroad company only to realize the error at a later date). 
77. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454. 
78. Id. at 456. 
79. Id. at 452–53. 
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legal duty, that could not be abandoned without cause and that actions 
taken must be in the interest of the people of that state.80 
B. Judicial Review Under the Public Trust Doctrine: Standing and the 
Political Question Doctrine 
 Illinois Central set the standard against which future cases involv-
ing the PTD could be measured and contrasted.81 There are generally two 
different types of cases that are brought utilizing the public trust doc-
trine: the first involves the enforcement of a duty on the state due to the 
actions that state has taken and the second involves seeking to compel 
the state to act.82 The plaintiff bringing the case must meet the elements 
of standing, which are injury in fact, causation, and redressability.83 The 
standing analysis, which was the major focus of Lujan, will be reviewed 
for each of the three factors and the burden of establishing each is on the 
party that brings the claim.84 According to the Lujan court, the plaintiff 
must be able to demonstrate that “that they have suffered an injury in 
fact, i.e., a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a 
legally protected interest.”85 The plaintiff must also be able to demon-
strate that there is a link, or causation, between that alleged harm and the 
defendant or in other words that the injury in fact is “fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’”86 Finally, the redressability prong of the standing analysis is 
where the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that there is some likeli-
hood, not just a speculative possibility, “that the injury will be ‘redressed 
by a favorable decision.’”87  
 Once the case has cleared the standing analysis, the court must also 
be presented with a matter that it can adjudicate without overstepping its 
                                                
80. Id. 
81. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004). 
82. See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387 (enforcement of a duty upon the state); 
National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (enablement of the state to 
act); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1993) (seeking to enforce a theory of public use for 
submerged lands under the PTD). 
83. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167 (2000); Washington Envt’l Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984), which states that “[t]he ‘fairly traceable’ and 
‘redressability’ components of the constitutional standing inquiry were initially articulated by this 
Court as ‘two facets of a single causation requirement.’”); Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. 
Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1228 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2008). 
87. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
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constitutional bounds by addressing a matter that is better handled by a 
different branch of government.88 This is called the Political Question 
Doctrine and the analysis is sensitive, as “the mere fact that a case touch-
es on the political process does not necessarily create a political question 
beyond courts' jurisdiction.”89 To that end, there is a six factor test that 
the court will apply to determine whether the matter before the court pre-
sents an issue known as a political question.90 If the claim fails to meet 
any of these factors, the case could be dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.91 
 The courts have reviewed numerous claims regarding the public 
trust doctrine, but this article will focus on several that highlight the abil-
ity for courts to review public trust doctrine issues without running afoul 
of the Political Question doctrine. In National Audubon v. Superior 
Court (“the Mono Lake case”), the California court reviewed the action 
of the Division of Water Resources of California when it granted the Los 
Angeles the ability to divert specific streams that fed Mono Lake.92 The 
result of the diversion of water from those streams caused the water level 
of Mono Lake to drop, which posed potential issues implicating the pub-
lic trust doctrine.93 The court had to balance competing issues of the pub-
lic trust doctrine and prevailing water rights law under the “appropriative 
water rights system which since the days of the gold rush has dominated 
California water law.”94 Given the traditional basis of the public trust 
doctrine and the resulting expansion within the California, the court rea-
soned that Mono Lake fit into the category of a navigable waterway or a 
fishery and qualified for protection under the public trust doctrine.95  
 Upon determining that the issue could be reviewed under the tenets 
of the public trust doctrine,96 the court viewed the trusteeship of the State 
as imposing a duty to manage the res, or the property of a trust, in a fidu-
                                                
88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing a six factored test for the political ques-
tion doctrine); Infra Part IV.C.1. 
89. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp.2d 676, 680 (2006) (citing to In 
re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F.Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927))). 
90 Id. at 217; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (quoting the six factored 
test from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
91. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. 
92. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d at 709–12. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 712–13. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 719–20 (discussing two state decisions in which the actions of a party had impacted 
public trust land and reasoning that “the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in Cali-
fornia decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributar-
ies”). 
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ciary manner,97 and to ensure that use of public trust lands is consistent 
with public purposes.98 The clash between the two systems of manage-
ment meant that one must give way to the other under our system of 
law.99 The court held that the State has an “affirmative duty to take the 
public trust into account” when managing resources of navigable waters 
and any impacts on the same.100 This resolution permitted the State to 
balance the competing uses for Mono Lake and its tributaries in a way, 
i.e. without making an initial policy determination on the allocation of 
water, that “such uses should not be destroyed because the state mistak-
enly thought itself powerless to protect them.”101 
 Just a few years after the National Audubon case, the Central Ver-
mont Railway attempted to sell a range of property to a real estate devel-
oper until the City of Burlington and the state of Vermont invoked the 
public trust doctrine to challenge the sale.102 A 19th century legislative 
act gave certain owners along Lake Champlain development rights for 
their property.103 The Central Vermont Railway’s land qualified under 
the act and over time the area had declined resulting in minimal occu-
pancy that prompted consideration of redeveloping the land.104 When 
redeveloping the land did not come to fruition, the Central Vermont 
Railway turned to a sale of the land.105 In reviewing the sale, the court 
cited Illinois Central’s restrictions on the alienation of such lands.106 In 
Vermont, the public trust doctrine is more than mere common law—the 
right to use public lands has been enshrined in the state’s constitution: 
[t]he inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, 
to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not in-
closed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters 
(not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and pro-
vided by the General Assembly.107 
                                                
97. Id. at 440–41. 
98. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726–29. 
99. Id. at 726–27 (reaching that competing systems of management “would occupy the field of 
allocation of stream waters to the exclusion of any competing system of legal thought”). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 732–33. 
102. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d at 1129. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1129–130. 
105. Id. at 1130. 
106. Id. (citing to Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), and Hazen v. Perkins, 
105 A. 249, 251 (Vt. 1918)). 
107. Id. at 1130–131. 
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The Railway attempted to assert right of ownership under two separate 
legislative acts, but the court was not persuaded.108 The Central Vermont 
Railway asserted a defense of laches, but the court sidestepped this in 
determining that “CVR does not hold title to the filled lands free of the 
public trust” and the state retains administrative control over the land 
such that “[a]ny substantial change . . . must therefore be consistent with 
a legislative grant or mandate . . .”109 Thus, the court resolved the dispute 
without exercising judicial control over the decision making process con-
trolled by the state as the National Audubon court had done. 
 The public trust is an age-old doctrine, with deep roots relating to 
the navigable waterways and submerged lands. Occasionally, there are 
violations by public trust doctrine trustees that need to be addressed and 
should be done so within the confines of the traditional public trust doc-
trine, such as the standard used in Illinois Central.110 Many theories and 
strategies that have been developed to hold public trust doctrine trustees 
accountable either by a novel application of the doctrine or by expansion 
of the doctrine. 
C. Attempted Expansion of the Fiduciary Duty Arising Under the Public 
Trust Doctrine 
1. Building a Foundation for Trustee Accountability 
 Climate change litigation is a relatively new phenomenon in United 
States jurisprudence, but there are older cases that provide insight into 
the reasoning of these recent cases. There are several notable cases that 
provide the basic foundation of what has been attempted, what has suc-
                                                
108. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d at 1132–134 (“We need not resolve this fundamental question of 
legislative power, however, because we hold that the legislature did not intend to grant the lands at 
issue free from the public trust. . . . Nor do we find that an intention to abandon the public trust is 
necessarily implicit in either of the acts before us. The 1827 Act can be read as a simple grant of 
wharfing rights and privileges, while the 1874 Act actually employs the language of trust law. Nei-
ther of these enactments is inconsistent with a continuing adherence to public trust responsibilities 
on the part of the legislature.”); see generally Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Com., 393 
N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979). 
109. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d at 1137; see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust 
Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 58 (2006) 
[hereinafter Conservative Reconstruction]. 
110. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 460 (“We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the 
ownership and control of the State in and over the submerged lands in Lake Michigan, by the act of 
April 16, 1869, was inoperative to affect, modify or in any respect to control the sovereignty and 
dominion of the State over the lands, or its ownership thereof, and that any such attempted operation 
of the act was annulled by the repealing act of April 15, 1873, which to that extent was valid and 
effective. There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard 
of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and manage it.”). 
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ceeded, and where the courts have drawn the line in those cases in which 
the plaintiffs have not been successful. 
 Nearly 100 years after Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.111, a simi-
lar issue resurfaced when Massachusetts brought suit against the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to seek review of an order denying 
rulemaking in September 2003.112 At issue were alleged injuries suffered 
and potentially to be suffered due to climate change because the EPA had 
denied a petition to begin regulating the emissions of carbon dioxide, as 
a pollutant, from new automobiles.113 The EPA contested the alleged 
harm suffered, but the Court did not agree with EPA’s analysis likening 
the standing qualification to “whether petitioners have such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination."114 The Court then turned to the 
Lujan factors for standing and also reasoned that the litigant was vested 
with a procedural right as a result of 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1).115 Further-
more, the Court recalled the language of Tennessee Copper in the further 
analysis of standing, but in some respects contrary to the standing analy-
sis in Tennessee Copper where actual harms were found, albeit tenu-
ous,116 the Court grants standing to Massachusetts under a “special solici-
                                                
111. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (reviewing the impacts and reme-
dies available to the State of Georgia for cross-border impacts from the operations of the Tennessee 
Copper Company’s based on the ability of a state to control, or in the alternative pursue remedies, 
the natural resources within their boundaries). Currently, this case has been cited over 40 times by 
the Supreme Court of the United States alone and perhaps, most importantly, in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
112. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497, 511, 514 
(2007). 
113. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 515–16; see also Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1131 (discussing the 
Ninth Circuit’s narrowing of the standing test announced in Massachusetts v. EPA); Randall S. 
Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litiga-
tion and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 121 (2008) (discussing how Massachu-
setts v. EPA has impacted standing in environmental jurisprudence). 
114. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517, 521–23 (citing to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962)) (internal quotations omitted). 
115. Id. at 517–18 (reasoning that “[w]hen a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that liti-
gant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing 
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant."). But see Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt 
v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113232, at *11 (citing that “the Tenth 
Circuit also reiterated that special solicitude does not eliminate the obligation to establish a concrete 
injury” in Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1238 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
116. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In contrast to the present 
case, there was no question in Tennessee Copper about Article III injury. There was certainly no 
suggestion that the State could show standing where the private parties could not; there was no dis-
pute, after all, that the private landowners had "an action at law."); Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
at 237–39; see generally David S. Green, Massachusetts v. EPA Without Massachusetts: Private 
Party Standing in Climate Change Litigation, 36 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 35, 62–63 (2012) 
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tude” standard as “Massachusetts [has a] well-founded desire to preserve 
its sovereign territory today.”117 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that the 
EPA’s lack of a “reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether 
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change” was arbitrary 
and capricious, which violated the law.118 Thus holding, the Court or-
dered that the EPA must base its decisions, regardless of whether to take 
action or not, in the statute and reversed the court of appeals judgment.119 
 Another key case in environmental litigation is the recent American 
Electric Power Company case, which involved multiple states, the city of 
New York and three land trusts suing five power companies for the gen-
eration of carbon dioxide in the operation of their power plant facili-
ties.120 This case is important because of the interplay of nuisance laws 
and regulations, such as the Clean Air Act,121 in the determination of the 
potential claim, not to mention the effect of congressional act on private 
claims.122 The relief the plaintiffs sought was a decree establishing a sys-
tem of caps on carbon dioxide emissions for each of the defendant and a 
method for that cap to be reduced on an annual basis.123 In the Court’s 
analysis of the issue, it was broken into three separate analyses which 
are: (1) the availability of a federal common law right, (2) whether con-
gressional action on a question previously at issue under federal common 
law removes a need for it to be addressed, and (3) when there is federal 
regulation on point, whether the resulting government entity’s inaction in 
regulating the particular cause of action does not result in displace-
ment.124 
 In the first portion of the analysis, the Court reasoned that there was 
a federal right to pursue a claim based on common law, but that the claim 
must be one of a national concern. 125 The notion of the federal com-
mon law is “academic question” due to the effect of the “Clean Air 
                                                                                                         
(discussing how standing analysis has become more problematic in the wake of this application/non-
application of standing in granting “special solicitude” to Massachusetts). 
117. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20 (“Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. 
§ 7607(b)(1). Given that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign 
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”). 
118. Id. at 534–35. 
119. Id. 
120. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); James W. Shelson, The 
Misuse of Public Nuisance Law to Address Climate Change, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 195, 205–09 (2011). 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1990). 
122. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532 (“The Clean Air Act and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency action the Act authorizes, we hold, displace the claims the plaintiffs seek to pur-
sue.”). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 2530. 
125. Id. 
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Act and the EPA actions the Act authorizes.”126 The plaintiffs faced an 
uphill battle due to the presence of the Clean Air Act, as noted by the 
Court when it stated that “legislative displacement of federal common 
law does not require the ‘same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest 
[congressional] purpose.’”127 To determine if Congress intended to dis-
place common law when enacting the Clean Air Act, the test is “whether 
congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law 
is simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at is-
sue.”128 The Court held that Congress did intend for the Clean Air Act to 
displace “any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-
dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”129 Once the Court 
held that displacement was authorized, the next step was to review the 
Clean Air Act for delegation to the EPA for enforcement, which as au-
thorized only provides for private enforcement in absence of EPA en-
forcement, but as the EPA had engaged in rulemaking that left no room 
for private actions.130 The EPA was free to engage in any of its author-
ized methods of enforcement and that congressional delegation was all 
that was needed to create displacement of the ability for a party to seek 
relief through litigation.131 The Court held that the Clean Air Act, which 
displaced the federal common law cause of action, preempted the plain-
tiff’s claim, and as a result the state law action could not be sustained.132 
 These three cases create the standard by which future climate 
change litigation will be weighed and, if lacking, will be dismissed. The 
next two cases will demonstrate how a claim can run afoul of that stand-
ard and accordingly be dismissed. 
                                                
126. Id. at 2537 (Massachusetts [v. EPA] made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify 
as air pollution subject to regulation under the [Clean Air] Act). 
127. Id.; see also Shelson, supra note 120, at 202–05 (discussing preemption of state law by 
Congress). 
128. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
129. Id. (“We hold that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any feder-
al common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power 
plants. Massachusetts [v. EPA] made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution 
subject to regulation under the Act. And we think it equally plain that the Act ‘speaks directly’ to 
emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants' plants.”). 
130. Id. at 2538 (“The Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon 
dioxide from domestic power plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal com-
mon law. We see no room for a parallel track.”). 
131. Mark Belleville & Katherine Kennedy, Cool Lawsuits – Is Climate Change Litigation 
Dead After Kivalina v. Exxonmobil?, 7 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 51, 55 (2013) [herein-
after Cool Lawsuits]. 
132. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 
U.S. 481, 488 (1987)); See also Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F.Supp.2d 314 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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 The first two cases, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. I and II, in-
volved a claim that alleged that the defendants contributed, by virtue of 
their release of “by-products that led to the development and increase of 
global warming, which produced the conditions that formed Hurricane 
Katrina, which damaged their property.”133 The district court heard ar-
guments on three main issues – standing, political question, and dis-
placement of common law claim.134 However, the court primarily ana-
lyzed the causation portion of the standing analysis and reasoned that the 
plaintiffs asserted causation given the overarching issue of EPA’s order 
on greenhouse gases “[did] not in and of itself support the contention that 
the plaintiffs' property damage is fairly traceable to the defendants' emis-
sions.”135 This lack of traceability to the defendant’s actions resulted in 
the inability of the plaintiffs to link the injuries allegedly suffered to the 
actions of the defendants and as such were not sufficient to survive the 
standing analysis.136 Furthermore, in the standing analysis the burden lies 
with the plaintiff to sufficient plead facts that demonstrate a traceable 
link to the defendants and the harms alleged were more tenuously con-
nected than those of Massachusetts v. EPA or American Electric Power 
Co.137  
 Additionally, a violation of political question negatively affected the 
plaintiff’s claims, as the plaintiff’s prayer for relief was ultimately “ask-
ing [the] Court to regulate emissions or to make policy determinations 
concerning climate change.”138 This was problematic because the po-
litical question doctrine, as previously discussed, does not permit 
the court to make policy decisions otherwise attributable to another 
branch of government and the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
complaint would mean the court must “determine that the defendants’ 
levels of emissions are ‘unreasonable” in order to rule on the claims.139 
On the issue of displacement, the Court ruled that the Clean Air Act dis-
placed the plaintiff’s claims based on the holding of Am. Elec. Power Co. 
                                                
133. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (2012); see also Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (2013); Shelson, supra note 121, at 209–12. 
134. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 849. 
135. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 858–61 (citing Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of 
Interior, 563, F.3d 466, 478 (2009)); See also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517; See generally Bellon, 
732 F.3d at 1131; Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 865 (W.D. Ky. 2014) 
(holding that plaintiff’s claim based on the defendant’s emissions constituted valid claims and that 
the Clean Air Act did not displace these common law claims). 
136. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
137. Id. at 861–62 (citing the Court’s decision in the prior Comer case disallowing “discovery 
that will likely cost millions of dollars, when the tenuous nature of the causation alleged is readily 
apparent at the pleadings stage of litigation”). 
138. Id. at 864. 
139. Id. 
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due to a similar claim that also required the Courts to make a determina-
tion as to the defendant’s emissions.140 
 In Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., the plaintiffs similarly claimed 
harm due to defendant’s emissions that caused an increase in tempera-
tures due to global warming, thus causing a reduction in Arctic sea ice 
protecting the shoreline of the Village of Kivalina.141 The plaintiff’s 
prayer for relief requested monetary damages to assist in the relocation 
of the village, which had an estimate cost of as much as $400 million.142 
At issue, similar to Comer, was the requirement that the court evaluate, 
i.e., making a policy determination, the defendants’ emissions to reach 
the underlying claims, which again raises the issue of the political ques-
tion doctrine.143 Despite potential political question issues, which the 
court side stepped in its reasoning,144 the court based its review of the 
case on standing.145 
 In the court’s standing analysis, the Court concluded that the plain-
tiffs had not sufficiently pled an injury that met the requirements under 
standing, a point that the plaintiffs conceded in their complaint when 
stating that “they are unable to trace their alleged injuries to any particu-
lar defendant,”146 and as such failed to meet the burden for standing.147 
On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs sought to have the dis-
trict court’s decision reversed, but the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
lower court had acted properly in their dismissal of the case and further 
added that the Clean Air Act in fact displaced the plaintiff’s claims.148 
 The foregoing cases establish a patchwork framework of statutory 
provisions, federal preemption, political question doctrine conflicts that 
                                                
140. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 865; See also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06–05755 
MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (discussing the claim by the State of Cali-
fornia against a group of automobile manufacturers. The plaintiffs sought damages rather than an 
injunction, which was a notable departure from previous climate change litigation. In the end, the 
Court held that “it cannot adjudicate Plaintiff's federal common law global warming nuisance tort 
claim without making an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”); 
Shelson, supra note 120, at 212–13 (discussing California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 
2726871 at *1). 
141. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (2009), aff’d, 696 
F.3d 849 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013); Shelson, supra note 120, at 213–15. 
142. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 870. 
143. Id. at 870–71. 
144. Id. at 872–76. 
145. Id. at 878. 
146. Id.; See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60. 
147. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883. 
148. Id. at 858 (basing their ruling on Supreme Court precedent, which states that “the type of 
remedy asserted is not relevant to the applicability of the doctrine of displacement.”); Cheswick 
Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
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are inherent in an attempt to establish trustee accountability within the 
scope of environmental law as well as the public trust doctrine. 
2. Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
 The Atmospheric Trust Litigation (“ATL”) theory is based on an 
application of the public trust doctrine that seeks to “hold govern-
ments . . . accountable for reducing carbon emissions” vis–à–vis the ad-
dition of the atmosphere, or the air, as an asset under the public trust doc-
trine.149 The theory proposes that the government, upon courts recogniz-
ing the atmosphere as an asset of the public trust, be held to a fiduciary 
duty for their actions, or inactions, relating to the atmosphere.150 The 
theory is applicable on either the national or global level because 
in ATL, the atmosphere is “characterized . . . as one of the assets in 
the trust, shared as property among all nations of the world as co-
tenants.”151 Ultimately, the theory proposes that the public trust 
doctrine, as found in English common law countries, or a foreign 
derivation be utilized to “enforce planetary carbon reduction require-
ments, formulated to hold each government accountable for its share of 
the necessary reduction.”152  
 The ATL theory has gained traction and is seen as a preferred 
method for seeking change in the current environment related to 
climate change for several reasons.153 First, the theory is rooted in 
legal tradition that will hold governments accountable while also protect-
ing the environment.154 Second, trustee accountability provides the po-
tential for a positive legal outcome should there be a breach of the fidu-
ciary duty due to the nature of the public trust doctrine’s provision for 
trustee.155 Finally, the theory adds to existing human rights and therefore 
also relies on the potential for enforcement to protect those rights.156 
                                                
149. See generally Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 59, at 99–100; Hope M. Babcock, 
The Public Trust Doctrine: What A Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393 (2009) (discussing the 
reasoning behind using the PTD as a stopgap measure before positive law can be enacted); Peter 
Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 315 (2000). 
150. Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 59, at 100; See also Nature’s Trust, supra note 
59, at 156–61, 221–22 (discussing a test for defining the trust corpus under the theory’s adaptation of 
the public trust doctrine and how ATL approaches climate change). 
151. See generally Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 59, at 99–100. 
152. Id. at 100. 
153. Id. at 100–03; see also Nature’s Trust, supra note 59, at 14. 
154. Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 59, at 101. 
155. Cool Lawsuits, supra note 131, at 82 (discussing an amicus brief for the Alec L. case); Na-
ture’s Trust, supra note 59, at 128 (explaining how the public trust fiduciary duty is discharged when 
the government’s conduct is “directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the 
people”). 
156. Adjudicating Climate Change, supra note 59, at 100. 
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 As ATL seeks to promote government accountability through litiga-
tion, there have been a series of cases that have sought these changes on 
both a state and federal level.157 The ATL cases have resulted in a mixed 
bag of successes and failures, but the claims generally fall into a trend 
where the cases that are successful are based on pre-existing legislative 
action to provide for the atmosphere or air as a part of the public trust.158 
Judicial endorsement of the ATL theory in these cases is not a judicial 
expansion of the public trust doctrine; rather, it is more an upholding of 
legislative intent. The courts typically have rejected the ATL theory in 
the cases where there is an absence of prior legislative action to address 
air or the atmosphere as a public trust asset.159 
 As the states evaluate their choices in the current environment of 
climate change threats, they must remember that the public trust doctrine 
imposes a duty on the state as trustee of the public lands to protect and 
use those lands in a way that benefits the citizens of that state.160 The no-
tion of the public trust doctrine, as argued by Professor Robin Kundis 
Craig, is that “management of water resources . . . generally anticipates 
continued human use of those resources.”161 This concept is at the heart 
of the ongoing conflict between governmental management of public 
lands versus the threats posed by climate change and as such can be a 
key to revitalizing the management process by aligning the interests of 
the general public, governmental regulators, and a state’s legislature so 
that those resources will be available for continued human use, e.g., the 
general public.162 Furthermore, the public trust requires that public prop-
erty be used for public purposes.163 The preservation of public trust lands 
from harm due to climate change impacts, both for their continued use 
                                                
157. See generally Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. App. 2015); Chernaik v. 
Kitzhaber, 328 P.3d 799 (Or. Ct. App. 2014); Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. 
D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561 *1 (Tex. Dist. Aug. 2, 2012), vac’d by, Tex. Comm’n on 
Envtl. Quality v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014); Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. 
Iowa Dept. of Natural Resources, 829 N.W. 2d 589, 590 (2013). Contra Barhaugh v. State, 264 P.3d 
518 (Mont. 2011); Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at 
*1, *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013); Svitak v. State, No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124, at *1 
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012). 
158. E.g., Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at at 1226–27; Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d at 894. 
159. See generally Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Filippone, 829 N.W.2d at 589. 
160. Supra Part III.A. 
161. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles 
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 34 (2010). 
162. Id. at 34, 43–53 (arguing for changes in legislative and regulatory behavior to create a 
statutory and regulatory environment that “will nevertheless improve resilience and adaptive capaci-
ty”). 
163. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 724. 
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under traditional public trust doctrine uses164 and as a resource for expan-
sive public trust doctrine uses,165 is a challenge that the government is 
responsible to undertake in its role as the trustee unless there be some 
proper action to alienate those lands from the public trust.166  
 Going forward, the states must determine what strategies they want 
to pursue in order to discharge their obligations under the public trust 
doctrine to protect the trust res from harm through climate change miti-
gation or adaptation. These strategies will likely vary widely, but will 
likely include incentives, improvements in regulatory framework, and 
grants for research in areas related to the protection of public trust assets 
or mitigation of climate change.  
IV. OFFSHORE POWER GENERATION AND THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
 Florida is well positioned for the expansion of energy production to 
include offshore methods given the very lengthy coastline.167 The issue is 
not whether it is feasible, but rather what options are available and will 
best suit the production environment on Florida’s coasts. The next two 
sections will discuss offshore power generation alternatives before transi-
tioning to a discussion of the overarching regulatory environment for 
these alternative methods of power generation. 
                                                
164. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“Public trust easements are traditional-
ly defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries. They have been held to include the right 
to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of 
the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.”). 
165. Id. (“The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass 
changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classifi-
cation favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that one 
of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is 
the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for 
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and 
marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.”). 
166. Id. (“‘[T]he state in its proper administration of the trust may find it necessary or advisa-
ble to cut off certain tidelands from water access and render them useless for trust purposes. In such 
a case the state through the Legislature may find and determine that such lands are no longer useful 
for trust purposes and free them from the trust. When tidelands have been so freed from the trust—
and if they are not subject to the constitutional prohibition forbidding alienation—they may be irrev-
ocably conveyed into absolute private ownership.’”); see also Adapting to Climate Change, supra 
note 4, at 814–29 (reviewing state specific applications of the public trust doctrine, which emphasiz-
es that the one size fits all approach is in some way inapplicable). 
167. Beaver, supra note 36 (stating that the Florida coastline is approximately 1,350 miles). 
2016] Public Trust Doctrine’s Fiduciary Duty Requirement 89 
A. Offshore Power Generation 
 For offshore power generation, there are several different types—
tidal or wave, wind, and the traditional oil, gas, and methane hydrates.168 
Given the global warming consequences of the latter of those options, 
this article will focus on the first two as they are among the least carbon-
intensive options available.169 These two types of offshore power genera-
tion have a maximum lifetime carbon dioxide equivalent, according to 
the IPCC Working Group III, of approximately 28 and 35, respectively, 
which puts them at the low end of the scale with hydropower being at the 
top with equivalent value of 2200.170 Given the clear advantages of wind, 
wave or tidal power generation in terms of its carbon emissions, a com-
parison of the various technologies is warranted. This article provides a 
brief overview of the technology for the purposes of discussing its im-
plementation strategies and encouragement of development as an action 
that should be considered by public trust trustees. 
1. Wave and Tidal Power Generation 
 Wave and tidal power generation is a potentially unlimited source 
of energy as the ocean is constantly in flux and waves are continuously 
being pushed to shore by oceanic winds. These technologies are being 
adopted throughout the world.171 However, the potential of wave or tidal 
energy is limited by the local topography in the area that is targeted for 
deployment.172 The amount of wave energy that the U.S. receives on its 
shores, although almost entirely untapped, is estimated to be equivalent 
to the country’s total hydroelectric energy production.173 
 Wave or tidal power generation works by harnessing wave energy 
through capture of the kinetic energy in the motion of the ocean’s waves 
applied to a generator, as designed by the particular technology applica-
                                                
168. See generally Megan E. Higgins & Jason Busch, Offshore Wind and Wave Energy and 
Ocean Governance, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153–91 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015). 
169. Thomas Bruckner et al., 2014: Annex III: Technology-specific cost and performance pa-
rameters, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1335 (Steffen Schlömer et 
al eds., 2014), available at http://report.mitigation2014.org/report/ipcc_wg3_ar5_annex-iii.pdf. 
170. Id. (reporting measurements in gCO2eq / kWh); see also Benjamin K. Sovacool, Valuing 
the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power: A critical survey, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 2940, 2950 
(2008), available at http://www.nirs.org/climate/background/sovacool_nuclear_ghg.pdf (relying on a 
survey of different analyses but providing a scale that places offshore wind lifecycle emissions at the 
low end of the continuum). 
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tion.174 There are several different types of wave energy technologies, 
which capture the kinetic energy through “floats, buoys, or pitching de-
vices.”175 More specifically, the current technology uses descriptions 
such as “point absorber, oscillating water column, subsurface pressure 
differential, attenuator, and rotating mass” to describe how the motion of 
the waves is harnessed and the technological approach utilized.176 Each 
technology has its own benefits and detriments.  
 Attenuator style applications of offshore power generation177 may 
be preferred over several others because their impact will likely be less 
harmful to the environment as compared to the oscillating water column 
or overtopping/terminator device178 and because their installation near-
shore may prevent the normal sediment movements in the ocean over a 
much larger area.179 The power generated by the installation, regardless 
of the technology chosen, is transferred onshore through a connection to 
a nearby power grid.180 It is estimated that full-scale commercial applica-
tions of wave energy production technologies is three to five years, but 
there are multiple companies actively working to create solutions that are 
economically feasible and research is being conducted in university set-
                                                
174. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 167; see generally Andrew Thornquest, The New 
Wave of Florida Energy: The Regulatory Path to Harnessing Marine Hydrokinetic Power, 34 PUB. 
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 191, 193–99 (2013); Ocean Wave Energy, BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Renewable-Energy-
Guide/Ocean-Wave-Energy.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
175. See Wave & Tidal Energy Technology, supra note 171. 
176. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 167; see also Wave Devices, EUROPEAN MARINE 
ENERGY CENTRE, http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-energy/wave-devices/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
(provides a description of each of the different technologies and an animation show the application 
in work); Wave Energy Systems, OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, http://
teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/hydrokinetic/restech/desc/wave/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
[hereinafter Indian Waves]. 
177. Wave Devices, supra note 176 (discussing how the attenuator operates by utilizing a sys-
tem of floating device that is generally placed perpendicular to the wave motion and moves in sync 
with the waves, essentially “rid[ing] the waves,” in order to generate power); Indian Waves, supra 
note 61; Thornquest, supra note 174, at 194 (discussing how attenuators have been placed as far out 
as ten kilometers); Id. at 196 (“Point absorber wave energy converters have a much smaller surface 
area than terminators and attenuators and collect their energy from a single point in wave swells.”); 
EUROPEAN MARINE ENERGY CENTRE, supra note 61. 
178. Wave Devices, supra note 176; Indian Waves, supra note 176; Thornquest, supra note 
174, at 196–97 (“Overtopping devices act like miniature dams by using the force of the waves to 
push water into an elevated reservoir, then releasing the collected reservoir waters back to the sur-
face of the sea.”). 
179. Wave Devices, supra note 176; see generally THE CARBON TRUST, Oscillating Water 
Column Wave Energy Converter Evaluation Report 67 (2005), available at 
https://www.carbontrust.com/media/173555/owc-report.pdf; Thornquest, supra note 174, at 197–200 
(discussing the environmental impacts of various wave energy technologies on humans, marine 
plants, and marine animals). 
180. Indian Waves, supra note 176. 
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tings.181 The advantage of wave energy is its continuous nature, but the 
limitation is that it is highly variable based on location of the installa-
tion.182 
 Tidal power generation uses a similar approach, but seeks to capture 
the kinetic energy of the waves through the tidal forces moving in and 
out.183 However, tidal power technologies, such as the barrage installa-
tion in La Rance, France, can present certain environmental issues due to 
the nature of their installations and they also rely on significant changes 
in the level of high and low tides to be effective.184 The environmental 
impact of tidal energy deployments is still being fully evaluated, but the 
potential for impacts are certainly present.185 
 However, there are other applications of tidal energy production 
that present less of an environmental impact as they are akin to sub-
merged wind turbines.186 There are two basic types of tidal turbines, hor-
izontal axis and vertical axis, which are named in reference to the direc-
tion in which the fins of the turbine are oriented.187 The potential value of 
these small site solutions is that they can be implemented without the 
same impact to the surrounding area and at depths that will preclude 
them from posing a hazard to navigation.188 These technologies can also 
be deployed from a floating platform, which would permit them to be 
movable in the event the need arises.189 Similar to their wave energy 
counterparts, the deployments would be connected to the energy grid via 
underwater electrical cable.190 While these technologies are still under 
                                                
181. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 167; see also Swood, Wave Energy Technology Be-
coming a Reality at Florida Institute of Technology (June 18, 2012), 
http://blogs.fit.edu/blog/campus/marine-environmental/wave-energy-technology-becoming-a-reality-
at-florida-institute-of-technology/. 
182. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INT. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., Technology White Paper on Wave En-
ergy Potential on the Outer Continental Shelf 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.camelottech.com/CMFiles/Docs/OCS_EIS_WhitePaper_Wave.pdf. 
183. Wave & Tidal Energy Technology, supra note 171 (“[T]he common model for tidal power 
facilities involved erecting a tidal dam, or barrage, with a sluice across a narrow bay or estuary. As 
the tide flows in or out, creating uneven water levels on either side of the barrage, the sluice is 
opened and water flows through low-head hydro turbines to generate electricity.”); Tidal Energy 
Systems, OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
http://teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/hydrokinetic/restech/desc/tidal/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
[hereinafter Indian Tides]. 
184. Indian Tides, supra note 183. 
185. Rachael E. Salcido, Rough Seas Ahead: Confronting Challenges to Jump-Start Wave En-
ergy, 39 ENVTL. L. 1073, 1077, 1085–86 (2009). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Tidal Devices, EUROPEAN MARINE ENERGY CENTRE, http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-
energy/tidal-devices/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (provides a description of each of the different 
technologies and an animation show the application in work). 
189. Id. 
190. Indian Tides, supra note 183. 
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development it may arrive in full-scale commercial deployments earlier 
due to the similarities to wind turbines.191 In Europe, there are multiple 
deployments around the United Kingdom; permitting has begun for a 
project near Juneau, Alaska; and, a recent pilot commercial license was 
issued for a deployment in the East River in New York by Verdant Pow-
er.192 The Roosevelt Island Tidal Energy Project in New York is a good 
case study of how a busy metropolitan area with active waterways can 
accommodate a submerged tidal energy project. As the pilot project in 
the United States, it will help define the future for tidal energy pro-
jects.193 
2. Wind Power Generation 
 As with wave and tidal energy production, European development 
of wind power alternative energy solutions is significantly ahead of the 
United States as there are multiple full-scale projects in place in addition 
to the framework established to promote wind energy development.194 
The Vindeby Wind Farm, the pilot project for wind farms, is a testament 
to the stability and effectiveness of wind power given its survival plus 
efficient power generation in excess of similar onshore wind farms.195 
The United States is catching up in its development of wind energy with 
                                                
191. Megan Higgins, Is Marine Renewable Energy a Viable Industry in the United States?: 
Lessons Learned from the 7th Marine Law Symposium, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 562 (2009); 
FLORIDA ENERGY SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM, Florida Energy Systems Consortium Annual Report 150–
54 (2014), available at http://www.floridaenergy.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/Nov_2014-FESC-
Annual-Report.pdf; Renewable Energy Technical Assessment Guide - TAG-RE: 2006, 
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE 8-1 (2007), available at 
http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001012722 (discussing a brief overview 
of the implementation and status of tidal energy projects, as of 2006). 
192. Wave & Tidal Projects, EUROPEAN MARINE ENERGY CENTRE, http://www.emec.org.uk/
marine-energy/wave-and-tidal-projects/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (displaying a variety of sites for 
both Wave Energy and Tidal Energy projects); Ocean (Wave and Tidal), RENEWABLE ENERGY 
ALASKA PROJECT, http://alaskarenewableenergy.org/why-renewable-energy-is-important/alaskas-
resources/ocean-wave-and-tidal/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015); RITE Project, VERDANT POWER 
(2014), http://www.verdantpower.com/rite-project.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
193. RITE Project, supra note 192. 
194. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 161; Global Offshore: Current Status and Future 
Prospects, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL (2014), http://www. gwec.net/global-offshore-current-
status-future-prospects/ (discussing European leadership in the development of wind turbines). 
195. Vindeby Offshore Wind Farm, LORC, http://www.lorc.dk/offshore-wind-farms-
map/vindeby (last visited Apr. 19, 2015); Vindeby Offshore Wind Farm, MT HØJGAARD, http://mth.
com/Projects/Offshore/Vindeby.aspx (“The 11 wind turbines produce 20% more electricity than can 
be produced by similar wind turbines on land”); GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 194 
(“Twenty-one years have passed since the [world’s] first offshore wind farm, Vindeby (5MW), was 
built in Denmark.”). 
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an increase of 4,854 megawatts of new capacity in 2014, an increase that 
represents in excess of four times the 2013 installed capacity.196 
 While onshore wind farms are nearly ancient history,197 offshore 
wind turbines are a relatively new application of that ancient concept.198 
The implementation of offshore wind turbines can vary as it depends on 
a number of factors. For example, the width of the continental shelf is a 
major concern for Japanese offshore wind power generation and the nar-
rowness of that continental shelf makes floating platforms ideal, as bot-
tom-mounted platforms are not feasible.199 The potential for offshore 
wind generation is aided by the fact that the winds present offshore “tend 
to blow harder and more uniformly than on land,” therefore there is a 
higher potential for energy generation than onshore.200 Wind turbines 
harness the kinetic power of these winds and, through the spinning of the 
blades attached to the turbine, electrical power is generated.201 This pro-
cess is essentially the inverse of the normal household fan that is ubiqui-
tous.202 In order to effectively capture the winds, turbines are mounted at 
heights of nearly 300 feet and routinely have blades of significant 
lengths.203 Given the disparities in costs, the development of a land-based 
                                                
196. Global Wind Report Annual Market Update 2014, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL 76 
(2014), available at http://www.gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/GWEC_Global_Wind_2014_Report_LR.pdf. 
197. History of Windmills @ Outwood Mill, OUTWOOD WINDMILL, 
http://www.outwoodmill.com/history/history-windmills/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (discussing the 
history of windmills and “The earliest known example of what we would regard as a windmill is that 
created by Heron of Alexandria, a Greek engineer in the 1st Century AD.”); Offshore Wind Energy, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-
Program/Renewable-Energy-Guide/Offshore-Wind-Energy.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) [herein-
after BOEM Offshore]. 
198. Global Offshore, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, http://www.gwec.net/global-
figures/global-offshore/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
199. Global Wind Report Annual Market Update 2014, supra note 196 
200. BOEM Offshore, supra note 197 (“Offshore winds tend to blow harder and more uniform-
ly than on land. The potential energy produced from wind is directly proportional to the cube of the 
wind speed. As a result, increased wind speeds of only a few miles per hour can produce a signifi-
cantly larger amount of electricity. For instance, a turbine at a site with an average wind speed of 16 
mph would produce 50% more electricity than at a site with the same turbine and average wind 
speeds of 14 mph. This is one reason that developers are interested in pursuing offshore wind energy 
resources.”); Robert W. Eberhardt, Note, Federalism and the Siting of Offshore Wind Energy Facili-
ties, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 374, 399–404 (2006). 
201. Higgins, supra note 191, at 567–70. 
202. Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as an 
Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 535, 539–40 (2007); BOEM Offshore, supra note 85 (discussing Offshore Wind 
Energy Technology, including a diagram that displays the various components of a wind turbine). 
203. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 540 (For example, the Zond Z-750, a turbine widely 
used on wind projects in the United States between 1998 and 1999, includes a tower 208 feet (63 
meters) high, with blades 79 feet (24 meters) in length, spanning a rotor diameter of 164 feet (50 
meters).”). 
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site is not nearly as daunting as it is offshore site. Both construction and 
maintenance costs associated with the marine environment are consider-
ably higher than compared to land-based environments.204 
 This basic understanding of how the turbines function and their de-
ployment, environmental, aesthetic, and maritime use concerns must be 
considered when choosing how to implement wind turbines and where to 
place them.205 There are issues relating to migratory birds and the regula-
tions developed around the taking of those birds that also stands as a po-
tential challenge in the effective siting of a wind turbine that is also ca-
pable of efficiently harnessing the kinetic energy of sufficient wind.206 
 The alternative solutions for generating power from the near limit-
less resources of the ocean and wind are there. The applications are being 
improved from their ancient origins and the choice of how to deploy 
them, what locations work, and the type of technology to employ largely 
comes down to a location specific determination that can be agreed upon 
by the various stakeholders.207 An agreement between stakeholders is 
necessary to find a path forward for renewable energy. As demonstrated 
in the Cape Wind project, which led to legal confrontation, regulatory 
hurdles were seemingly overcome while public concern hurdles were 
not.208 
B. Statutory Framework of Alternative Energy Solutions 
 The regulatory environment for the provision of offshore power 
generation is a complex, cooperative federalism approach where coastal 
states have certain rights and the remaining authority is centered in the 
federal government.209 This section will discuss federal regulation, as the 
majority of the regulation on the subject takes place at the federal level, 
followed by a discussion of the regulatory framework in Florida. 
                                                
204. Id. at 544. 
205. Id.; Higgins, supra note 191, at 569. 
206. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 555–65 (discussing the impacts of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems Administration Act, 
National Environmental Policy Act, among others, in relation to the development of wind power); 
infra Part III.B. 
207. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 587–90 (discussing what changes are needed to sim-
plify the development of wind power and the interrelation between regulation, investment potential, 
and the demand for power). 
208. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 164–65; Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 545–55. 
209. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 170. 
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1. Federal Regulatory Framework 
 In the 1950s, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act210 in re-
sponse to acts by several states during the 1940s to claim jurisdiction 
over resources off their respective coasts.211 This Act created a regulatory 
scheme whereby the coastal states were granted jurisdiction over certain 
activities related to a strip of the continental shelf that extended for three 
nautical miles from their shore.212 However, certain states were granted 
additional authority in recognition of their former sovereign status prior 
to joining the union.213 These states are permitted to exercise control up 
to nine nautical miles offshore.214 Beyond the three or nine nautical mile 
point, jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf215 (OCS) rests exclu-
sively in the federal government and is primarily regulated by the Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM).216  
 BOEM replaced the Minerals Management Service and the Bureau 
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement in October 2011.217 BOEM 
shares the regulatory burden for the management of the OCS with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) based on an under-
standing of the respective roles established between the two agencies.218 
This additional regulation by FERC over offshore power generation, spe-
cifically hydrokinetic energy, is a relatively new change that was an ex-
pansion from inland hydropower regulation.219 FERC’s authority in this 
area originates in the Federal Power Act.220 However, the regulatory au-
thority of FERC does have some limitations when it comes to “[p]rojects 
that involve experimental technology, which will run for a short period 
of time for educational, or data collection purposes, and from which the 
                                                
210. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012). 
211. Id.; Eberhardt, supra note 200, at 381–82; Michael J. McHale, An Introduction To Off-
shore Energy Exploration—A Florida Perspective, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 571, 574–79 (2008); see 
also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
212. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 168. 
213. Id. (“Louisiana, Texas, and the Gulf Coast of Florida are an exception, with state jurisdic-
tion extending as far out as nine [nautical miles] offshore.”). 
214. Id. 
215. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) defines the OCS as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside 
of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and of which the 
subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 
216. Higgins & Busch, supra note 168, at 170. 
217. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation & Enforcement HomePage, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
218. Id.; BOEM/FERC Guidelines on Regulation of Marine and Hydrokinetic Energy Projects 
on the OCS (Version 2, July 19, 2012), http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-FERC-staff-guidelines/; Sal-
cido, supra note 185, at 1079. 
219. Thornquest, supra note 174, at 202–03 (noting that “marine hydrokinetic energy projects 
off the coasts of U.S. territories will be nearly exclusively regulated by FERC, as the Submerged 
Lands Act limits BOEM’s regulation to waters off states shores only.”). 
220. Higgins, supra note 191, at 571–72. 
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power generated will not interfere with an interstate electric grid.”221 
BOEM, but not FERC, also will play a role in regulating experimental 
projects and applicants that wish to pursue one, to the extent that such 
projects extend into the OCS.222 Additionally, the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act223 (NEPA) plays a role for offshore siting by requiring an 
environmental review, also known as an environmental impact statement 
(EIS), for any “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment” and the level of detail on the review is very 
high.224  
 Another regulatory component of the siting permit process is the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 225, which like NEPA will place a signifi-
cant burden on the developer of the project.226 The ESA is significant 
because of the role it plays in federal regulation as it not only regulates 
directly, but it also regulates indirectly by requiring that “all federal de-
partments and agencies utilize their authorities to conserve endangered 
and threatened species, as well as their ecosystems.”227 The potential is-
sue under the ESA is that it prohibits a take,228 which is defined to in-
clude “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."229 Given the poten-
tial for a wind turbine, wave energy, or tidal energy platform to take, the 
ESA looms quite large when considering the regulatory impacts to the 
development of a project.230 However, the incidental take provision en-
                                                
221. Thornquest, supra note 174, at 202–03. 
222. Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change urgently 
Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 
1132–133 (2012); Thornquest, supra note 174, at 204–05; see also Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 604 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
223. Under NEPA, an EIS must provide information, in detail and potentially at an extraordi-
nary cost, on the following areas: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any ad-
verse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) 
alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible 
and irretrievable commitments of resources involved in the proposed action should it be implement-
ed. Thaler, supra note 222, at 1134–135. 
224. Thaler, supra note 222, at 1133–134 (2012); Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 562. 
225. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
226. Thaler, supra note 222, at 1135–136. 
227. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 559–61 (“The ESA seeks to ensure that all federal de-
partments and agencies utilize their authorities to conserve endangered and threatened species, as 
well as their ecosystems. . . . [T]he ESA commands all other federal agencies to comply with its 
provisions, even where such protection conflicts with the agency's primary responsibility.”). 
228. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining take as meaning “to 
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct”) . 
229. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 559–61. 
230. Id. (“Therefore, any activity related to the construction or maintenance of wind turbines 
could expose an individual or entity to liability where it results in the harming, wounding, or killing 
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acted in a 1982 amendment to the ESA does provide some flexibility for 
a developer, if an application for incidental take is granted.231  
 Moreover, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)232 also impacts 
the development of a wind turbine project due to the potential interfer-
ence with migratory birds.233 The MBTA is administered by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, which is an agency of the Department of the Interior, 
and invokes strict liability that makes certain conduct unlawful when 
related to a migratory bird.234 The MBTA has a potentially broad impact 
as the Act defines a migratory bird as a “species native to the United 
States or its territories” and there is no incidental take provision as found 
in the ESA.235 If a migratory bird is taken, the statutory penalties can be 
significant and care should be taken when determining an effective site 
to evaluate potential migratory patterns in that area.236 
 The total framework of the process to successfully secure a permit 
for the installation of a project, statutes, and the various agencies in-
volved is a lengthy and detailed framework, thus beyond the scope of 
this article.237 
2. Florida Regulatory Framework 
 Florida has a much simpler regulatory environment238 Florida law 
provides very few distinctions in renewable energy compared with those 
                                                                                                         
of a protected species. While liability would be expressly limited to instances involving certain spe-
cies expressly designated under the ESA, any wind turbines located within the habitat of such spe-
cies would be affected. Thus, the ESA would limit the number of locations suitable for wind turbine 
projects.”). 
231. Id.; see also Thaler, supra note 222, at 1135–137 (discussing the ESA and its impacts). 
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233. Dinnell & Russ, supra note 202, at 556–57. 
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235. Id.; Thaler, supra note 222, at 1138–139. 
236. Thaler, supra note 222, at 1138–39. 
237. See generally Regulatory Framework and Guidelines, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT, http://www.boem.gov/Regulatory-Development-Policy-and-Guidelines/ (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2015); Oregon Wave Energy Trust, Wave Energy Development in Oregon, Licensing & 
Permitting Requirements (2009), http://oregonwave.org/oceanic/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/OWET_Licensing_-Permitting_July2009.pdf; Higgins & Busch, supra 
note 53, at 170–77 (discussing regulatory environment and roadblocks to development of oceanic 
renewable energy projects); see also Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891 (2006) (As the MBTA is rather specific to wind turbines, the wave 
and tidal energy projects have to contest with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), which is the “primary law for managing marine fisheries 
in federal waters.”). 
238. Thornquest, supra note 174, at 209–12 (discussing the regulatory environment of Florida). 
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of traditional power generation.239 The state has statutes relating to pro-
moting renewable energy in the interest of the state240 and there are ad-
ministrative codes relating to oil and gas.241 Therefore, management of 
renewable energy production would fall under a myriad of federal regu-
lations and the Coastal and Aquatic Management Areas division of the 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“FDEP”).242 The 
Aquatic Preserves Act of 1975243 provides restrictions on areas that may 
be available for development of tidal or wave energy projects as it pro-
vides for various preserves throughout the state.244 The Florida Fish and 
Wildlife Commission, which manages concurrently with FDEP, oversees 
the Florida Endangered Species Act245 and has the power to effectively 
ban development of marine kinetic energy production in areas where an 
endangered species is located.246 
 Florida has the authority to define its coastal zone management plan 
(CZMP) under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), which is 
taken into consideration when federal agencies evaluate any permitted 
activities that are located off the state’s coast and such federal activities 
must comply with the state’s CZMP.247 This is significant because the 
state has the power to contest federally permitted activities that run afoul 
of the state’s CZMP. Florida’s CZMP permits FDEP to “make final con-
sistency decisions on federal actions within state waters to ensure that all 
activities having reasonably foreseeable coastal effects are consistent 
with the enforceable policies of the federally-approved FCMP.”248 
 The limited state regulation in Florida gives rise to the potential for 
significant issues if a project should be sought within the nine nautical 
mile zone where regulation falls to the State of Florida249. However, 
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249. Outka, supra note 239, at 1069. 
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there is relatively low potential for wind energy for Florida and, as such, 
it creates less urgency for Florida to create a regulatory environment that 
is conducive to the promotion of offshore renewable energy.250  
V. PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH FIDUCIARY 
DUTY ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
 This proposal focuses on two main points. First, the public trust 
doctrine requires that trustees of public trust lands take action, under a 
fiduciary duty standard, to protect the corpus of the trust when faced with 
potential harm such as climate change impacts. Second, a failure by a 
trustee to meet that standard, and accordingly be brought into court to 
enforce compliance with its fiduciary duty, does not constitute an expan-
sion of the trust when the basis for the breach is executed within the tra-
ditional confines of public trust doctrine. 
A. Public Trust Doctrine Fiduciary Duty Requires Action 
 In order to fulfill the fiduciary duty imposed that the public trust 
imposes on the government, the notion that the management of those 
public resources for the benefit of the public should require, at a mini-
mum that the states manage proactively rather than merely reactively.251 
The pathway to proactive management is partially cut through the courts 
by embracing a view of the public trust doctrine that enables, rather than 
restricts, and encourages states to manage their public resources in a bal-
anced fashion.252 However, the courts have a history of treating the pub-
lic trust doctrine as evolutionary, which causes uncertainty for the states 
in managing their public resources.253 It also suggests that courts need to 
exercise restraint from interpreting the scope of the public trust doctrine 
in a manner that enables it to reach beyond its tidal lands and navigable 
waterway foundations.254 
                                                
250. Thornquest, supra note 174, at 212. 
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 States are meant to manage their public trust assets in a way that 
preserves them for future generations. As such, utilization of those assets 
in a way that can benefit the current generation as well as a funding 
mechanism for research for future generations seems to be the ultimate 
fulfillment of that requirement.255 There are several different ways that 
the state can choose to adopt proactive management strategies that would 
encourage the development of carbon neutral or alternative energy; for 
instance, wind turbine deployment, simplifying permitting procedures 
within the scope of their management under existing statutory confines, 
passing legislation that will have a similar effect as a regulatory change, 
and creating incentives for private entities that operate within their bor-
ders, such as funding grants for research into improving the existing 
technologies or offering subsidies providers of such alternative energy 
solutions.256  
 Governmental entities need information to act in a manner most 
compliant with the fiduciary duty, which means the government also 
needs to create a regulatory framework in which necessary information 
can be acquired or researched.257 This information gap highlights why 
the creation of a grant for research on different subjects related to energy 
production and climate change can be viewed as a component of the fi-
duciary duty of trustees because without reliable information the deci-
sions being made will be subject to shortfalls.258 The path of least re-
sistance within the management of public trust resources is the option 
that the governments are most likely to pursue. Research is a key way to 
maintain those public lands for public purposes as required under the 
public trust doctrine as lands that are lost due to climate change and ar-
guably lost through lack of maintenance.259 On the other hand, there are 
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times when the decision makers may need to make decisions that have 
unfortunate outcomes and strict interpretations of the public trust doc-
trine may result in even worse judicial outcomes in terms of promoting 
governmental proactive management of public trust resources.260 
 For example, the Florida Legislature has passed legislation that cre-
ated a requirement for the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Ser-
vices to “promote the development and use of renewable energy re-
sources” through a three-pronged strategy.261 This legislation coupled the 
State’s Comprehensive Plan262 with a section that identifies Florida’s 
strategy for dealing with energy resources, as a subpart of the state’s nat-
ural resources, and combating climate change.263 This type of forward-
thinking action by a state legislature, albeit relatively minimal compared 
to other state legislatures, is an example of proactive management of 
public trust resources and encouragement of alternative energy solutions. 
These efforts would be consistent with the duty this article argues are 
incumbent upon states as trustees under the public trust doctrine if legis-
lation is followed through to completion.264 However, Florida can go fur-
ther than the actions that they have taken thus far. The reinstatement of 
the renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) is a good first step, but more 
can be done.265 The encouragement of alternative energy solutions, such 
as offshore power generation solutions, has been identified by the IPCC 
as a method of combating climate change while also meeting the demand 
of a populace for energy.266 These technologies provide a pathway for 
legislatures to balance their duties under the PTD as well.267 
 Mere legislative action or executive prompting is only one half of 
the puzzle and the other half is the follow through by the responsible 
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state agencies, which in the case of the legislation has largely been left 
incomplete in the areas of significance.268 Failure to follow through to 
completion can leave a trustee exposed to liability for the breach of their 
fiduciary duty when a trust asset stands imperiled.269 However, is this 
truly meeting the burden under the public trust doctrine in mere words, 
but not in actions? The former would seem to be the case rather than the 
latter given the lack of progress,270 despite legislative authority and duty 
under the law. Thus, it falls to the courts to interpret the application of 
the fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine against the state’s ac-
tions to determine how deficient the state is in its actions. 
B. Accountability of Existing Duty is Not an Expansion of the Public 
Trust Doctrine 
 When there has been a potential violation of the fiduciary duty un-
der the public trust doctrine, the public has the option of pursuing civil 
action against the state to enforce the obligations of the public trust doc-
trine under the common law.271 However, the enforcement of obligations 
arising under the public trust doctrine does not necessarily coincide with 
an expansion of the fiduciary duties of the trustee or the scope of public 
trust doctrine lands.272 In fact, enforcement of fiduciary duty under the 
public trust doctrine is fairly characterized as an enforcement of the tra-
ditional scope of the public resources under the doctrine.273 Expansion of 
the public trust doctrine is often accomplished through enforcing, or at-
tempted enforcement, of some right under the public trust doctrine to the 
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use or against the alienation of a resource that falls outside of the tradi-
tional scope of the public trust doctrine assets.274 
 This concept is important in the framework of arguing for an ex-
panded understanding of what the fiduciary duty entails to avoid unnec-
essary confusion with an argument for an expanded scope,275 which re-
quires very specific circumstances or novel argument in order to suc-
ceed,276 from that of an expanded fiduciary duty under the trust.277 The 
goal is not to change why the governmental decision making process op-
erates as it does, but rather to ensure that along the way that environmen-
tal concerns, such as climate change impacts, are a consideration in the 
ultimate decision that is being made.278 If the government does not give 
consideration to the environmental concerns that are behind the decision 
or perhaps driving it, then government runs the risk of intentionally, at 
worst, or inadvertently, at best, violating the fiduciary duty standard un-
der the public trust doctrine.279 Offshore power generation provides gov-
ernments with a method to eat the proverbial cake of providing power 
generation to their constituents while enjoying the benefits of a public 
trust doctrine compliant manner of doing so. As the technologies im-
prove and become more prevalent, albeit perhaps with the encourage-
ment of government funded research or incentives for production, the 
return on investment will only increase. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 As we progress into this next phase of the planetary change, the 
questions that will be faced will largely revolve around what can be done 
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to adapt to these changes, but more importantly what should be done. 
The State of Florida has fallen down on upholding some of those duties 
when it comes to the half-finished measures on renewable energy, such 
as the RPS,280 but the Legislature has enacted various incentives for indi-
viduals and businesses to engage in renewable energy platforms.281 While 
these measures are perhaps not sufficient in the view of some,282 it can 
hardly be said that the State of Florida is completely avoiding their duties 
as trustee under the public trust doctrine in exercising some level of rea-
sonable care.283 For a trustee under the public trust doctrine, there is a 
significant risk of breaching their fiduciary duties if they are asking what 
should be done too late.284 When these missed opportunities arise, regard-
less of the reason for why they were missed, the question, perhaps 
somewhat ironically, will once again fall to what can be done to alleviate 
the damage incurred by that missed opportunity. Irrespective of what 
options may be put forth to remedy the harm, the standard against which 
they should all be measured is the traditional standard of the public trust 
doctrine and judicially enforced compliance to that standard, i.e., trustee 
accountability, should never be seen as an expansion of the public trust 
doctrine standard such as that sought under the ATL theory.285 
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